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3 Benjamin Constant and the 
limits of popular sovereignty 
Nora Timmermans 
The frst French theorist of liberal democracy 
Over the past few decades, scholars of both political theory and intellectual his-
tory – and from both sides of the Atlantic – have managed to carve a position for
Benjamin Constant (1767–1830) as a canonical political theorist, if not in his
own right, at least as a crucial rung in the evolution of Western modern politi-
cal thought. Helena Rosenblatt (2009) has shown that the ideas of Constant,
who was active as a writer, philosopher, journalist, and politician, have been
influential from the moment they were first formulated, albeit in different ways
and directions. Yet, nowadays, it is especially Constant’s keen eye for constitu-
tional mechanics that is appreciated in the secondary scholarship. The scholarly
interest in Constant’s constitutional and political thought reflects the sense of
crisis that has been haunting liberal democracy ever since the 1960s and that has
taken different forms. Today, it is the worldwide success of populism and the
growing number of authoritarian regimes that feed both the belief that liberal
democracy is in urgent need of saving and the interest in Constant’s political
thought. 
The first wave of Constant-interpretation was immersed within so-called ‘Cold 
War liberalism’. Isaiah Berlin’s 1958 essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (1969) is 
probably the most famous example of this approach. Keeping totalitarianism at 
bay was the central tenet of Western political thought after the Second World 
War, especially when the vivid memory of fascism was amplified by growing com-
munist regimes in the East (Rosenblatt, 2009, pp. 369–373; Timmermans, 2019, 
pp. 184–188). In this context, interpreters tended to overemphasise Constant’s 
distrust of politics, thereby reducing his political theory to a single argument 
for the primacy of ‘negative liberty’, i.e. of an area of individual existence where 
political interference is absent altogether (Berlin, 1969; Dodge, 1980). 
Post-1968, the attention shifted towards the positive elements in Constant’s 
political thought. Hofmann’s publication of the manuscript Les principes de poli-
tique applicable à tous les gouvernements (1980) facilitated the shift by making one 
of Constant’s most sophisticated political treatises, written between 1806 and 
1810 but unpublished, for the first time widely accessible to scholars. The text 
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works. The year 1980 also marked the start of the ambitious and ongoing project 
to publish Constant’s Oeuvres complètes1 and the publication of the influential 
interpretations of Constant’s political theory by Stephen Holmes and Marcel 
Gauchet. Grange’s publication of the Fragments d’un ouvrage abandonné sur 
la possibilité d’une constitution républicaine dans un grand pays (1991) added 
another fundamental, hitherto unpublished political treatise to the available body 
of Constant’s work. The manuscript was written at about the same time as the 
1806 Principles and elaborates for the first time – and in a republican framework 
– Constant’s famous notion of ‘le pouvoir neutre’ (Cf. Rolland, 2008). 
The thus-expanded primary material was enthusiastically interpreted in the late
1990s and early 2000s. Biancamaria Fontana (1991), George Armstrong Kelly
(1992), Lucien Jaume (1997), Tvzetan Todorov (1999), and Helena Rosenblatt
(2008), among others, have made key contributions to the present understanding
of Constant’s political thought. Today, the contours of that understanding are
well in place (e.g. Chopin, 2002, pp. 35–40; Delbouille, 2006, p. 260; Garsten,
2009, p. 92; Vincent, 2011, p. 110): Constant, together with his intellectual
inspiration Germaine de Stael and the better known and widely read Alexis de
Tocqueville, is considered to be at the origins of a French branch of political
liberalism that brought about the first (French) theorists of ‘liberal democracy’
(cf. Geenens and Rosenblatt, 2012). The approach is eloquently summarised by
Tzvetan Todorov: 
Constant invents neither the democratic (or republican) principle of the sov-
ereignty of the people nor the liberal principle of the limitation of power. 
Nonetheless it is he who articulates them, who holds them up against the 
real-life experience of the Revolution, the Empire, and the Restoration, who 
thus gives flesh to abstractions. It is he who reveals their consequences and 
sometimes their dangers. Constant is one of the first, and one of the most 
brilliant, authors who chose, among all the options that arose at the time, 
the one that appears to us today to be obvious (even if we are far from fulfill-
ing it in all its perfection) – Revolution without Terror, popular sovereignty 
with respect for personal freedoms. In this, he is the first French theorist of 
liberal democracy. 
(Todorov, 1999, p. 41) 
Under the guise of divergent labels such as ‘liberalisme du sujet’ (Jaume, 1997),
‘political moderation’ (Craiutu, 2012), or ‘liberal republicanism’ (Jainchill,
2008), contemporary interpreters tend to focus on Constant’s conception of the
legitimacy of political rule instead of on his supposed preference for the altogether
absence of rule. Underlying this shift is the assumption that Constant “occupies
an intriguing middle ground in comparison to other positions of his time” when
























Benjamin Constant and the limits of popular sovereignty 39 
it comes to “the tension between popular sovereignty and the restraints on sov-
ereignty” (Geenens and Sottiaux, 2015, pp. 305–306). This “intriguing middle
ground” is also the purported reason why Constant’s political thought is not
merely of historical interest but also of particular relevance for present-day political
theory and practice (cf. Hofmann, 1980, p. 380; Holmes, 1980, p. 260; Todorov,
1999, p. 41). Constant represents the commonsensical position that governmen-
tal authority can and should be at once popularly grounded and limited by a more
fundamental framework (be it normative, political, or constitutional). 
This “intuitive” liberal democratic rendition is reflected in the abundant schol-
arly attention that has been given to Constant’s conception of limited popu-
lar sovereignty, as a result of which the following passage has become the most 
quoted of Constant’s entire oeuvre: 
There is, on the contrary, a part of human existence which by necessity 
remains individual and independent, and which is, by right, outside of any 
social competence. Sovereignty has only a limited and individual existence. 
At the point where independence and individual existence begin, the juris-
diction of sovereignty ends. If society oversteps this line, it is as guilty as the 
despot who has, as his only title, his exterminating sword. 
(Constant, 1815/1988, p. 177) 
The passage itself is well known by now, but it raises two issues that are rarely
addressed in the secondary literature. First, there is the issue that the boundaries
of “social competence” need to be defined and justified. This distinct problem
is not discussed here (I do not know of a comprehensive analysis of this issue,
but Feldman [2008, pp. 682–689] offers some useful reflections). Secondly,
Constant’s statements regarding the limited character of sovereignty say very little
about how sovereignty should be understood within those limits. This is the issue
that this chapter seeks to address. Generally, it has been overlooked by the second-
ary literature. This negligence is to a certain extent excusable, given that, as we shall
see, Constant himself only cursorily developed the positive side of the principle of
popular sovereignty. But without a positive account of Constant’s conception of
popular sovereignty, the liberal democratic rendition of Constant’s position will
always remain something akin to an intuition rather than a full-fledged theorisa-
tion. This chapter favours the latter approach and aims to clear a path for it. 
One positive reading promoted within the contemporary Constant literature
is Bryan Garsten’s analysis of Constant’s theory of representative government
(Garsten, 2009).2 Garsten argues that Constant’s theory aims to keep open and
maximise the opportunities for the popular contestation of governmental represen-
tation. Constant’s aim is contrasted with a more unilateral and superficial under-
standing of representative government, which would be “asking the government
2 Similar interpretations have been put forward by Gauchet (1995; 1997; 2005), Manent 




























as a whole to represent the popular will as it can be found through any particular
vote or poll” or “as it could be imagined to emerge from a process of deliberation
or from an independent analysis of the public interest” (ibid., p. 91). Constant
sought to “multiply and challenge governmental claims to represent the people”
(ibid.) and did so for “fundamentally democratic reasons” (ibid., p. 92): 
In asking instead for a government to multiply and challenge representative 
claims, representative government aims (on this view) to provoke debate 
about precisely what the popular will is and thereby to prevent any one inter-
pretation of the popular will from claiming final authority. It aims to foster 
and institutionalize popular impatience with our rulers, to both fuel and 
channel popular grievances against those in power. 
(Ibid., p. 91) 
Constant’s conception of representative government thus reflects “a fundamental 
and unchanging desire to find ways of institutionalizing resistance to central-
izing and usurping authority” (ibid., p. 100). Although I fundamentally agree 
with Garsten’s conclusions, which characterise Constant’s position as ‘liberal 
democratic’ because it is pluralist and dynamic, I believe they are not sufficiently 
grounded in Constant’s texts. My analysis serves both as a theoretical foundation 
and a critical examination of that liberal democratic assessment. 
It starts with a reconstruction of Constant’s understanding of the principle of
popular sovereignty, starting from his 1815 Principles of Politics. Constant never
used the term ‘principle’ light-heartedly and neither did he when discussing the
principle of popular sovereignty. All of his theoretical endeavours are predicated
on the assumption that there are principles to everything that exists. This is not
to say that Constant has much patience for abstract theorising or metaphysics; the
principles he has in mind are based on (his assessment of) political experience: they
can be discovered, explained, and, most importantly, applied (Hofmann, 1980;
Fontana, 1991, pp. 13–16). With the discovery of and adherence to principles,
Constant seeks to ward off arbitrariness, i.e. “the absence of rules, limits, definitions,
in one word, the absence of everything that is precise” (Constant, 1797/2003, p.
38). Arbitrariness, according to Constant, should be avoided at all costs, especially
in politics. This is why he has always taken a special interest in debunking the falsi-
ties that his opponents have advertised under the guise of principles (cf. Constant,
1806/2003, p. 22). He does so by rigorously dissecting the terms and concepts
they use. Even though I do not aim to disparage Constant’s principle of popular
sovereignty, I believe that bringing a similar conceptual rigour to bear on his own
argumentation concerning this principle is the best way to reconstruct its mean-
ing and its implications. This is what I do in the section ‘Constant’s Principle of
Popular Sovereignty’. In the section ‘Assent as Sovereign Power’, I scrutinise two
particular elements of the conception of popular sovereignty that results from my
reconstruction in the first section: Constant’s understanding of the collective sub-
ject of popular sovereignty and his arguments concerning the institutions needed
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Political Implications of Popular Sovereignty’, Constant avoids some of the prob-
lems usually associated with constitutionalism by limiting popular sovereignty to
its critical dimension and detaching it from its constitutive dimension. But first, a
few words about Constant’s oeuvre are due. 
Constancy in Constant’s work? 
As Biancamaria Fontana has accurately noted (Fontana, 1991, p. 11), one particu-
lar issue that every Constant scholar has to confront is the point of entry into his
vast body of work. Constant wrote numerous political treatises (two of his more
important ones even remained unpublished during his life) and published several
pamphlets and many newspaper articles. He maintained an extensive correspond-
ence with family, friends, and colleagues across Europe and his interventions in par-
liament are well documented.3 In addition to the sheer size of his oeuvre, Constant
enthusiastically copy-pasted within his own texts. It is therefore notoriously dif-
ficult to separate the wheat from the chaff in terms of the originality of his ideas. 
Moreover, Constant has a reputation for being politically versatile. Active as 
a political actor from 1796 until 1830, his career spanned more than 30 years 
– the most turbulent ones of the post-revolutionary era. Other contemporary 
interpreters have done the work of analysing Constant’s positions in light of their 
shifting political context. As I do not assess Constant’s overall political evolution 
nor the theoretical consistency of his oeuvre as a whole here, it suffices to say that 
despite some discussion on when precisely Constant reached his mature theoreti-
cal position (for a short but useful overview, see Vincent, 2011, p. 18 and foot-
notes), most contemporary analyses argue for a certain degree of theoretical, if 
not political coherence in his work, thus rejecting the ad hominem criticism that 
Constant was an opportunistic turncoat (cf. Deguise, 1966, pp. 3–37; Deguise 
traces the formerly prevalent hyper-negative assessment of Constant’s personality 
back to Saint-Beuve’s detrimental portraits). 
My reconstruction of Constant’s conception of popular sovereignty starts from
the first chapter of the 1815 Principles of Politics (Principes de politique applicables
à tous les gouvernements représentatifs et particulièrement à la constitution actuelle
de la France), titled ‘On the Sovereignty of the People’. This is the first published
text where Constant posited his adherence to “the principle of the sovereignty of
the people” in those precise terms. Unfortunately, Constant does not live up to his
ambition of providing a “precise and exact definition” (Constant, 1815/1988, p.
175) of the principle of sovereignty. Its meaning needs to be reconstructed based
on the subsequent argumentation in the first chapter. My objective is precisely
to follow the internal logic of this particular text to reconstruct and interpret its
argumentation. Pieced together, this argumentation turns out to be as simple as it
is compelling, for it seems to adopt a logical more than a political rationale. 
3 Constant was appointed as Tribune from 1799 until 1808 and elected as deputy from 1819 


















That I follow the text’s internal, conceptual logic also means that I intention-
ally refrain from the historical contextualisation of Constant’s positions. The ques-
tion of whether my reconstruction is representative of Constant’s overall position 
nevertheless stands, especially since Constant seems to shift to a more conditional 
endorsement of popular sovereignty after 1815 (Constant, 1818/1872, p. 275). 
At the beginning of 1830, Constant even appears to have come to the unqualified 
rejection of popular sovereignty: 
Two systems have, throughout history, divided the world: the system of pop-
ular sovereignty that I deny and the system of divine right that I detest. […] 
Let us ban the word sovereignty, properly speaking, from our vocabulary. 
There are, in society, needs to fulfil, faculties to exercise, liberties to guaran-
tee. Unlimited sovereignty does not exist anywhere. 
(Harpaz, 1989, p. 176) 
Kalyvas and Katznelson (1999) have argued that there was a fundamental evolution
in Constant’s views on political legitimacy, although they have identified a differ-
ent tendency on the basis of different texts (“As Constant’s thought matured, he
moved from a primarily republican position, then to a purely liberal orientation,
culminating in a more synthetic hybrid we call immanent liberalism, encompassing
three apparently opposed principles of legitimacy: democratic, liberal, and tradi-
tional”, Kalyvas and Katznelson, 1999, p. 514). According to their categorisation,
the 1815 Principles of Politics that is my focal point is situated within the last stage
of Constant’s intellectual development. I, however, contend that there is more con-
sistency in Constant’s views on political legitimacy and that the later stage is fully
compatible with the earlier ones (for this reason, I will occasionally draw on both
earlier and later texts as well). Constant’s understanding of sovereignty has always
been at once popular and limited. Even in his very first pamphlets, published in
1796 and 1797 in support of the Directory, Constant argues against arbitrary power
and in favour of constitutional limitations (e.g. Constant, 1796/2003). He thus
consistently rejects a particular, unlimited understanding of popular sovereignty.
Consequently, the shift indicated above exists only in the formulation of his posi-
tion, not in its essence. As I show in this chapter, Constant endorses a similarly con-
sistent positive conception of popular sovereignty, although it is a particular one. 
Constant’s principle of popular sovereignty 
The opening paragraph of Constant’s 1815 Principles of Politics reads as follows: 
Our present constitution formally recognizes the principle of the sovereignty 
of the people4 that is the supremacy of the general will over any particular will. 
4 Constant refers to the (in)famous Acte additionnel aux Constitutions de l’Empire du 22 avril 
1815, also known as ‘la Benjamine’, written by Constant himself, at the request and under the 
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Indeed this principle cannot be contested. In our days many have attempted 
to obscure it; the evils which were caused and the crimes which were com-
mitted on the pretext of enforcing the general will lend apparent strength 
to the reasonings of those who would like to assign a different source to 
the authority of governments. Nevertheless those reasonings cannot stand 
against the simple definition of the words they use. The law must be either 
the expression of the will of all, or that of the will of some. 
(Constant, 1815/1988, p. 175) 
Constant identifies “the principle of the sovereignty of the people” with “the
supremacy of the general will over any particular will”. This identification needs to
be understood in light of Constant’s contention that “[t]here exist only two kinds
of power in the world. The one, illegitimate, is force. The other, legitimate, is the
general will” (ibid.). Constant argues that if power serves a particular will, it is
always illegitimate because it must be based on force [“la force”] (ibid., note that
Fontana’s translation of both ‘force’ and ‘pouvoir’ into ‘power’ is imprecise at this
point). If power serving a particular will would not be based on force, it would be
“sanctioned by the assent of all” [‘l’assentissement de tous’] (ibid.). In other words,
it would no longer serve a particular will, but the general will. A particular will can
thus only prevail on the basis of force. And because “force belongs to whoever
takes it”, it is senseless to call power that is based on force “legitimate” (ibid.).5 
It follows that the principle of popular sovereignty or “the supremacy of the 
general will over any particular will” for Constant simply means that legitimate 
power should prevail over illegitimate power. And being “sanctioned by the 
assent of all” is a necessary condition for power to be legitimate. It is, of course, 
not a sufficient condition; in the 1815 Principles of Politics as well as in other 
texts, Constant stresses that the legitimacy of political power also depends on 
its limited extension (e.g. ibid., p. 177). Here, as I am only addressing the posi-
tive meaning of popular sovereignty, it is important to note that even if political 
power stays within its proper limits, it requires the sanction of the assent of all to 
be legitimate. Any kind of power that is not sanctioned by general assent simply 
amounts to force and is therefore illegitimate. Power sanctioned by the assent of 
all should prevail over power that is not sanctioned by the assent of all. Constant 
asserts that this basic provision holds true for every type of political system:6 
makes no explicit mention of ‘popular sovereignty’, nor for that matter do the other constitu-
tions of the Empire that the Acte additionnel is meant to supplement and modify. It merely 
states in the preamble: “In consequence, the following articles, forming an act supplementary 
to the constitutions of the Empire, shall be submitted for the free and solemn acceptance of all 
citizens throughout the whole extent of France” (https://www.napoleon-series.org/research
/government/legislation/c_additional.html). 
5 Here Constant’s argument echoes Rousseau’s analysis of ‘The Right of the Strongest’ in The 
Social Contract (Rousseau, 1762/2002, p. 158). 
6 Constant does not make a distinction between assenting to the regime as a whole (the way it 
is organised) or its concrete policies. This has to do with the fact that, as I show, Constant’s 
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This principle applies to all institutions. Theocracy, royalty, aristocracy, 
whenever they rule men’s minds, are simply the general will. When, on the 
other hand, they fail to rule them, they are nothing but force. In short there 
are only two sorts of power in the world: one, illegitimate, is force; the other, 
legitimate, is the general will. But while we recognize the rights of that will, 
that is, the sovereignty of the people, it is necessary, indeed imperative, to 
understand its exact nature and to determine its precise extent. 
(Ibid., p. 175) 
The principle also works the other way around: in theory, given that it does not 
exceed its limits, every form of power that is properly sanctioned by the assent of 
all can be legitimate, regardless of how it is organised or exercised. Constant only 
excludes anarchy and despotism, which, according to him, cannot be the object 
of assent: 
This principle does not deny the legitimacy of any form of government. In 
some circumstances society may want a monarchy and in others a republic. 
So these two institutions may therefore be equally legitimate and natural. 
Those who declare one or the other illegitimate or against nature are either 
party mouthpieces and do not say what they think, or else they are ideologi-
cal dupes and do not know what they are saying. There are only two forms of 
government, if we may even give them that title at all, which are essentially 
and eternally illegitimate, because no society could want them: anarchy and 
despotism. 
(Constant, 1806/2003, p. 7) 
But what does it mean, for power to be sanctioned by the assent of all? In any 
case, it does not mean that power needs to be exercised through a particular form 
of government. Constant deems the principle of popular sovereignty to be a uni-
versal principle, valid for all governmental regimes. Constant’s understanding of 
popular sovereignty hence does not require governmental power to be exercised 
by the people at large for it to be legitimate. Governmental power exercised by a 
small number of rulers (or a single one) can be equally legitimate if the require-
ments are met. In fact, although Constant spends the larger part of his political 
theory explaining how governmental power should be organised and exercised, 
this is of little relevance for his understanding of popular sovereignty. 
I argue that a proper understanding of Constant’s conception of popular sov-
ereignty should be based on the implicit distinction that his framework makes 
between two kinds of political power, i.e. ‘governmental power’ and ‘popular 
sovereignty’. I am aware that this distinction looks similar to Rousseau’s well-
known differentiation of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘government’ (cf. Tuck, 2016), or 
conception of sovereign power does not have a constituent dimension. There is hence no 
other option than to express one’s assent through the existing regime. 
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to the distinction between constituent power and constituted power that is at 
the centre of contemporary debates in constitutional and democratic theory (cf. 
Walker and Loughlin, 2008). But the resemblance is deceptive. It is true that 
Constant and Rousseau attribute an equally general application to the principle 
of popular sovereignty, deeming it to be at the basis of all legitimate political 
systems. But for Rousseau, the decisive feature of popular sovereignty is that 
the legislative power is exercised by the people as a collective body (Rousseau, 
1762/2002, p. 179; Manin, 1997, pp. 74–75). The governmental form is deter-
mined by the body that exercises executive power. In a democracy, e.g., the 
whole or the majority of the people exercise both legislative and executive power 
and are thus both sovereign and government (Rousseau, 1762/2002, p. 199). 
Recently, it has been argued that Rousseau’s definition of sovereignty thus identi-
fies it with constituent power, i.e. with fundamental decisions about the organi-
sation of society, whereas ‘government’ concerns everyday politics (Tuck, 2016; 
Colon-Rios, 2016). 
Whether or not one accepts this ‘constituent’ reading of Rousseau, it does 
not overlap with the distinction that I identify in Constant’s framework. For 
Constant, legislative power, even of the constituent kind, is situated in the 
sphere of ‘governmental power’ and can be exercised by a small minority. In 
other words, Constant’s understanding of governmental power comprises both 
Rousseau’s understanding of ‘sovereignty’ (legislative/constituent power) and 
Rousseau’s understanding of ‘government’ (executive power/everyday politics). 
Constant’s principle of popular sovereignty is thus not dependent on the manner 
of the exercise of executive power or legislative power. For Constant, popular 
sovereignty concerns a separate form of power that I call sovereign power. As I 
show in the remainder of the chapter, sovereign power is a proper though par-
ticular form of political power. Sovereign power means that the sanction of the 
assent of all establishes the legitimacy of governmental power. It does not have a 
constituent element. The implications of this understanding of popular sover-
eignty are discussed in the concluding section. First, the particular features of 
Constant’s conception of sovereign power need to be examined. 
Assent as sovereign power 
The collective subject of sovereign power 
The first feature that I examine is the collective, i.e. the popular element of 
Constant’s understanding of sovereign power. Even though Constant’s preoc-
cupation with the individual and individual rights has often been emphasised 
in the secondary literature, except for the ‘constructivist’ rendition proposed by 
Garsten, his particular conception of the collective subject of popular sovereignty 
has not been given much attention. I argue that Constant theorises the subject of 




(a political community in the sense of a single moral person with a separate, inde-
pendent collective personhood and agency).7 
Throughout his texts, Constant refers to the subject of popular sovereignty in 
rather vague and strongly varying terms: ‘the association’, ‘society’, ‘the people’, 
‘the nation’, or even just ‘all’ (‘tous’). When discussing popular sovereignty in 
the 1815 Principles of Politics, the most elaborate account Constant gives of its 
subject is, in fact, a negative one: 
In a society founded upon the sovereignty of the people, it is certain that no 
individual, no class, are entitled to subject the rest to their particular will. But 
it is not true that society as a whole has unlimited authority over its members. 
The universality of citizens is [the] sovereign in the sense that no individual, 
no faction, no partial association can arrogate sovereignty to itself, unless it 
has been delegated to it. But it does not follow from this that the universal-
ity of citizens, or those who are invested with the sovereignty by [it], can 
dispose sovereignly of the existence of individuals. 
(Constant, 1815/1988, pp. 176–177, modified 
translation) 
It is clear by now that Constant focuses mostly on what sovereignty does not mean. 
And it certainly does not mean unlimited power. Constant rejects Rousseau’s def-
inition of the social contract as “the complete alienation of each individual with 
all his rights, without any reservations, to the community” precisely because it 
results in unlimited power (ibid., p. 177). Yet, Rousseau’s definition of the social 
contract is closely intertwined with his conception of collective subjectivity and 
Constant’s critique of the former cannot be understood apart from his critique of 
the latter. Rousseau’s theory of popular sovereignty hinges on the fact that “the 
sovereign” constitutes a “body politic”, a political community with a separate 
purpose, agency, and personhood; a collective entity that is not reducible to its 
individual members: 
Right away, in place of the particular individuality of each contracting party, 
this act of association produces a moral and collective body, composed of as 
many members as the assembly has voices, and which receives from this same 
act its unity, its common self (moi), its life, and its will. This public person, 
which is thus formed by the union of all the individual members, used to be 
called a city, and now is called republic or body politic. 
(Rousseau, 1762/2002, p. 164) 
Such an understanding of collective subjectivity is crucial to Rousseau’s goal 
7 The distinction, with a long history in political thought, goes back to Roman private law, 
where a distinction existed between universitas (association) and societas (aggregate) as differ-
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[t]o find a form of association that may defend and protect with the whole 
force of the community the person and property of every associate, and by 
means of which each, joining together with all, may nevertheless obey only 
himself, and remain as free as before. 
(Ibid., p. 163) 
Some have taken Rousseau’s conception of the body politic to favour a homogene-
ous, natural community (based on, e.g. ethnic ties) (e.g. Gauchet, 1997, pp. 51–64;
Dunn, 2002, pp. 13–16). Yet, Rousseau explicitly confirms the constructed char-
acter of the body politic by arguing that the body politic comes about through the
alienation of the aspiring members’ individual sovereignty. Rousseau also repeatedly
refers to “the sovereign” as a “moral” (Rousseau, 1762/2002, p. 164, 166) or
“artificial” (ibid., p. 197) rather than a natural person. Neither does it follow from
his definition of the body politic that Rousseau completely disregards the individual
members and their rights: the power that the body politic has over its members may
be absolute, but it cannot be arbitrary (ibid., p. 174). Rousseau’s conception means
first and foremost that “the sovereign” qua sovereign has a separate existence. The
collective entity, although it is a moral person, is ontologically real. 
Constant’s understanding of collective subjectivity is very different from 
Rousseau’s. To begin with, as we have seen in Constant’s famous passage about 
limited sovereignty, the individual members do not transfer, let alone alienate, 
any of their rights to the collective entity. Individual rights should remain outside 
the scope of governmental power. As a consequence, they also remain outside the 
scope of sovereign power, which has the function of establishing the legitimacy of 
governmental power and is, in that sense, dependent upon the latter’s extension. 
On this reading, it is thus, first and foremost, Constant’s conception of govern-
mental power that is limited, the limited conception of popular sovereignty is 
merely a consequence thereof. 
Constant is not at all interested in the ‘act’ of aggregation itself. He takes 
society, i.e. the aggregate of individuals, as a given (Constant, 1821/2015, pp. 
29–30). And the political organisation of that aggregate does not fundamen-
tally change the position, the status, or the character of the individuals who are 
involved in it. Contrary to Rousseau, who considers the collective to be an artifi-
cial but real public person with concrete characteristics, Constant explicitly calls 
the sovereign “an abstract being”: 
The repose and happiness of all is better guaranteed by the independence 
of each, in everything which is not harmful to others, than by any of the 
attempts, open or disguised, violent or equivocal, which are constantly 
repeated by authority and unfortunately blessed by some shortsighted phi-
losophers, to endow society, that abstract and fictive being, at the expense of 
individuals, the sole real and sensible beings. 
(Ibid., p. 33) 
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For Constant, the collective does not have its own, separate reality. The collec-
tive subject of sovereign power is merely the sum of these individuals and not 
an independent collective person. In Constant’s framework, the crucial step of 
Rousseau’s social contract, i.e. the constitution of the body politic, is not taken. 
There is no constitution of a political community. As I argue in the concluding 
section, Constant’s understanding of sovereign power does not have a constitu-
ent dimension. 
The individual exercise of sovereign power 
Popular sovereignty is thus attributed to an aggregated collectivity and it is exer-
cised by the individual members. More precisely, they exercise it in their own 
name and on their own behalf rather than on behalf of the collective. Constant’s 
sovereign power is the specific power of the individual to give their assent to 
governmental power. For Constant, sovereign power is thus a generalised form 
of individual assent rather than a collective power. This interpretation, although 
perhaps unconventional, is confirmed in one of Constant’s earliest political texts. 
Because this particular text is not often discussed in the secondary literature, it is 
worth quoting the relevant passage at length: 
It is a universal principle, true in all times and circumstances, that no man can 
be bound except by the laws in which he has concurred. In a very restricted 
society, this principle can be applied in an immediate manner and does not 
need an intermediary principle to become a habitual practice. But in a dif-
ferent combination, in a very large society, we must add a new principle, a 
principle intermediary to that which we have just stated. This intermediary 
principle says that individuals can contribute to the formation of laws, either 
in person or by their representatives. Whoever wishes to apply the first prin-
ciple to a large society without employing the intermediary, would inevitably 
upset it; but this upheaval, which would attest to the ignorance or ineptitude 
of the legislator, would prove nothing against the principle. The State would 
not be shaken because of the acknowledgment that each of its members 
must concur in the formation of laws, but because one was unaware that, in 
the surplus of a given number, the members must, in order to concur, be 
represented. 
(Constant, 1797/2003, p. 35, my translation) 
The principle that “no man can be bound except by the laws in which he has 
concurred” refers to the principle of popular sovereignty. It restates the idea that 
only legitimate governmental power can create a legal obligation (whereas force 
or illegitimate power cannot). And governmental power can only be legitimate 
if it is sanctioned by the assent of all. The passage also emphasises the individual 
character of the exercise of that sovereign power: “this intermediary principle says 
that individuals can contribute to the formation of laws, either in person or by 












   
   
  
Benjamin Constant and the limits of popular sovereignty 49 
Obviously, some form of institutional organisation is required to allow indi-
viduals to exercise sovereign power, i.e. express their assent.8 As Constant stipu-
lates, individual assent can be expressed either directly or through representation.
Electing representatives amounts to the exercise of sovereign power: it is an expres-
sion of assent that establishes the legitimacy of their legislative (i.e. governmen-
tal) power. Contrary to what is usually assumed (e.g. on the basis of Constant’s
lecture on The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns, 1988b),
Constant does not argue that popular sovereignty necessarily requires representa-
tive government. Admittedly, given that France is a large society,9 he does not
spend much energy on the Rousseauian scheme wherein the individual members
(permanently) participate in the legislative assembly in person. But he accepts it
as a theoretically valid option. A different form of the direct expression of assent
is included in the 1815 Acte additionnel that Constant drafted himself and to
which he refers in the 1815 Principles of Politics: the Acte made it possible for the
(enfranchised) population to directly ratify the constitution (cf. Laquièze, 2003). 
Constant’s representative system is a complex institutional arrangement 
with five governmental powers and refined checks and balances (Constant, 
1815/1988, pp. 184–185). I focus exclusively on the elective segment of that 
arrangement as I am only interested in the exercise of sovereign power, i.e. the 
expression of assent. In the 1815 Principles of Politics, Constant advocates for the 
direct popular election of the second legislative chamber (ibid., pp. 201–213).10 
The question is who (or what) is represented by the elected representatives, given 
that the subject of sovereign power is not a body politic but an aggregate of 
individuals? When those individuals elect the representatives, they establish the 
legitimacy of their legislative power. As Constant stipulates, from that moment 
on, the power of the representatives becomes the general will (ibid., p. 175). The 
legislative power represents the general will, and the general will is represented by 
the legislative power. So, whereas the individual members cannot act on behalf 
of ‘society’ as a whole (they exercise sovereign power in their own name), the 
elected representatives can (they exercise governmental power in the name of the 
aggregate). Constant accepts this implication but in a qualified manner. The gen-
eral will/interest needs to be understood as the aggregate of the individual wills 
(and only a limited part thereof), and it is thus composed of multiple concrete, 
separate interests: 
8 My focus here is on the organisation/exercise of sovereign power and not on the organisa-
tion of governmental power. The latter is, for Constant, an issue that does not directly per-
tain to the principle of popular sovereignty. 
9 The arguments that Constant provides in support of the representative system are mostly of 
a sociological nature (Constant, 1819/1988, pp. 314–315). Although they are very interest-
ing in themselves, I leave them aside, as they do not touch upon the theoretical issues that I 
want to discuss in this text. 
10 This chamber exercises “the representative power of public opinion” and shares the legisla-
tive power with the first, hereditary chamber. 
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The general interest is nothing but the reunion, the conciliation of all the 
private interests that exist simultaneously. If the general interest was some-
thing else, it would a chimeric abstraction. […] It is not necessary to claim so 
much contempt for private interests: these are the only real interests because 
society is nothing but the aggregation of the private individuals that are a 
member of it. 
(Constant, Session des chambres de 1818 à 1819, 
Discussion sur le projet relatif aux pétitions. Cited 
in Feldman [2008, p. 691, footnote 76]) 
With this view, Constant goes against the “very exaggerated idea of the general 
interest” (Constant, 1815/1988, p. 205) that prevailed in the post-revolutionary 
constitutional debates. As Lucien Jaume has argued (Jaume, 1998, pp. 161– 
166), the dominant position, defended by Sieyès and Cabanis among others, was 
that popular unity should be substantive and therefore handed down from above. 
This was the only way the unity of the general will could be achieved and guar-
anteed. The general will was not to be constructed by collecting and synthesising 
individual or sectional input; representatives were not to represent their elector-
ate, they were chosen to determine ‘the general will’ on behalf of the nation as a 
whole. In other words, the dominant view corresponds to the understanding of 
the collective subject of popular sovereignty as a body politic. As a consequence, 
electoral colleges were generally preferred over the direct popular election of rep-
resentatives. Constant’s conception of sovereignty power, on the contrary, rejects 
the idea of a substantive popular unity whether it is presupposed bottom up or 
enforced top down. 
The political implications of popular sovereignty 
Based on this analysis of Constant’s conception of popular sovereignty, I princi-
pally agree with Garsten’s assessment of Constant’s theoretical/political position 
as pluralist and dynamic, even though I think it is theoretically more precise to 
attribute these characteristics to Constant’s conception of popular sovereignty 
instead of to his conception of representative government. Whereas Garsten 
claims that Constant theorises representative government as a correction to pop-
ular sovereignty (Garsten, 2009, p. 91), I have argued that Constant’s represent-
ative system allows the individual members of the aggregation to express their 
assent, i.e. exercise their sovereign power. In my reading, popular sovereignty 
and representative government are thus not so much opposed but connected, 
although I believe that the connection, for Constant, is not a necessary one. Yet, 
overall, I agree with Garsten that Constant is not worried about the one-on-one 
transferral of popular will into governmental power but, on the contrary, heavily 
emphasised the possibility of contesting governmental power from below. 
It is easy to see that Constant’s conception of the aggregated subject of sov-
ereign power endorses a significant degree of pluralism. Because he thinks of 
this subject (i.e. society) as the aggregate of its individual members, he can easily 
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accept that society harbours multiple, different, and potentially conflicting inter-
ests. Constant does not believe that society is (or should be) characterised by 
unity or homogeneity: “variety is what constitutes an organisation, uniformity 
is mere mechanism. Variety is life, uniformity is death” (Constant, 1814/1988, 
p. 77). The fact that sovereign power is not exercised in the name of a collec-
tive in the sense of a body politic with its own purpose, agency, and personhood 
also helps to guarantee the possibility of contesting the legitimacy of governmen-
tal power. For Constant, submitting governmental power to the “assent of all”, 
exercised by the individual members in their own name and on their own behalf, 
is a way to prevent particular groups from indefinitely usurping governmental 
power: 
The axiom of the people’s sovereignty has been thought of as a principle 
of freedom. It is in fact a principle of constitutional guarantee. It aims to 
prevent any individual from seizing the authority which belongs only to 
the political society as a whole. It determines nothing, however, about the 
nature of this authority itself. It in no way adds to the sum of individual liber-
ties, therefore, and if we do not turn to other principles for determining the 
extent of this sovereignty, freedom could be lost, despite the principle of the 
sovereignty of the people, or even because of it. 
(Constant, 1806/2003, p. 11) 
It is precisely because the possibility of contestation needs to be guaranteed 
that Constant does not think of popular sovereignty as a principle of collective 
empowerment. It does not entail the constitution of a collective subject. The 
essence of sovereign power is individual judgment, rather than the formation 
and expression of collective will. Sovereign power does not concern the constitu-
tion of governmental power, but merely the possibility to approve or contest its 
legitimacy. In other words, it is crucial that ‘governmental power’ and ‘sovereign 
power’ are exercised by individuals in different capacities (the former in the name 
of society, the latter in their own name). 
Paradoxically, this conception of sovereign power also introduces a bias in 
favour of the existing institutions. The fact that sovereign power is recast as the 
possibility of contestation has a conservative penchant, at least in Constant. It 
is hard to see how assent could be expressed or withdrawn except through the 
existing institutional framework. Although others like Rousseau and Sieyès have 
identified this as a fundamental problem for political theory (i.e. the infamous 
paradox of constituent power, cf. Walker and Loughlin, 2008), it is not an issue 
at all for Constant: sovereign power simply does not have a constituent dimen-
sion. The power to constitute governmental power is, according to Constant, not 
a part of popular sovereignty: 
There really is a prerogative – when we are speaking abstractly – that society 
does possess and does not delegate to the government, namely the right 
to change the organization of the government itself. To delegate this right 
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would set up a vicious circle, since the government could use it to transform 
itself into a tyranny. But this very exception confirms the rule. If society does 
not delegate this prerogative, neither does it exercise it itself. Just as it would 
be absurd to delegate it, so it is impossible to exercise it and dangerous to 
proclaim it. 
(Constant, 1806/2003, p. 18) 
In order to serve its purpose, i.e. “to prevent any one interpretation of the popu-
lar will from claiming final authority” (Garsten, 2009, p. 91), such a constitutive 
dimension is also unnecessary and could even be detrimental. As Constant writes, 
it could be used to transform the existent system into a tyranny with the risk 
of completely eliminating the power to contest the legitimacy of governmental 
power. The objective to keep the possibility for contestation open is realised at 
the cost of maintaining the institutional status quo. Constant’s understanding of 
popular sovereignty thus entails genuine opportunities for contesting the legiti-
macy of governmental power while also working to keep the existing organisation 
of governmental power in place. 
In conclusion, I want to emphasise that the way Constant understands popular 
sovereignty is a form of political power that is crucially important. Legitimacy 
requires that citizens can express or withdraw their assent to the regime and its 
concrete policies. Sovereign power, however, does not exhaust all the possible 
forms of political power. In fact, the crisis of democracy that keeps the interest 
in Constant’s theory alive may require us to theorise (and practice) alternative 
forms of power that do have a constituent dimension and are less tied to the 
institutional status quo. 
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